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Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right 
R. Anthony Reese* 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Essay, I want to explore in more depth the precise nature of the 
relationship between a copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works based on her copyrighted work and the inquiry into transformativeness that 
informs the determination of whether an unconsented use of a copyrighted work is 
a fair use and therefore noninfringing.  I hope that better understanding this 
relationship might help clarify the nature of the transformativeness inquiry in fair 
use analysis, as well as how that inquiry does or does not affect the derivative work 
right.  I conduct this exploration by studying all of the relevant appellate court 
opinions to see whether courts treat the fair use and derivative work issues as 
related, and if so how.  I conclude that appellate courts do not view fair use 
transformativeness as connected with any transformation involved in preparing a 
derivative work, and that in evaluating transformativeness the courts focus more on 
the purpose of a defendant’s use than on any alteration the defendant has made to 
the content of the plaintiff’s work. 
I.  THE POTENTIAL OVERLAP BETWEEN TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT 
A.  TRANSFORMATION IN FAIR USE AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK DEFINITION 
Copyright law grants copyright owners certain exclusive rights in their works, 
including the right to prepare “derivative works” based on their works.  Those 
rights, however, are expressly limited by the fair use doctrine: any use of a work 
that qualifies as a fair use does not infringe on the work’s copyright.  Section 107 
of the Copyright Act instructs courts that in determining whether a particular use is 
fair, they should consider four non-exclusive factors.  In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., the Supreme Court, in analyzing the statute’s first fair use factor (“the 
purpose and character of the use”), said that: 
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether 
 
 *  Arnold, White & Durkee Centennial Professor, School of Law, The University of Texas at 
Austin; Visiting Professor, NYU School of Law, Spring 2008. Thanks to Christopher Leslie, Diane 
Zimmerman, and the symposium participants for helpful conversations and comments on this paper, and 
to Barton Beebe for sharing his data on circuit court fair use opinions.   
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the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects’” of the original creation, or instead 
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to 
what extent the new work is “transformative.”1 
The “transformative” nature of the defendant’s use has thus become a major part 
of fair use analysis, given the Court’s view that transformative uses “lie at the heart 
of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of 
copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding 
of fair use.”2 
The rise of transformativeness as an explicit, and important, aspect of fair use 
analysis obviously has potential implications for the copyright owner’s exclusive 
right, granted in section 106(2) of the Copyright Act, to prepare derivative works 
based on her copyrighted work, since derivative works seem, by definition, to 
involve some transformation of the underlying work.  The current statute defines a 
“derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”3  The illustrative 
examples are for the most part works that involve some change in, or 
transformation of, the preexisting work (though the degree of change may vary 
among the listed categories of works, as well as among the actual works within any 
listed category).  And the final residual clause of the definition emphasizes the 
connection between transformation and the creation of derivative works: “any other 
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 
Commentators have worried that the emphasis that Campbell placed on 
transformativeness in fair use analysis will affect the scope of the copyright 
owner’s derivative work right to control forms in which her work is transformed.4  
Since most derivative works within the scope of the copyright owner’s derivative 
work right generally involve transformation of the underlying work, if that act of 
transformation itself weighs in favor of fair use, then most derivative works will 
have a stronger case for fair use.5  As a result, weighing transformation of a 
copyrighted work in favor of fair use could potentially mean that many ordinary 
derivative works, which would generally be within the copyright owner’s exclusive 
 
 1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal citations omitted). 
 2. Id. at 579 (internal citation omitted). 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “derivative work”). 
 4. See, e.g., Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for 
Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 126-27 (2001); Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Expanding the 
Transformative Use Test for Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. REV. 579, 592-93 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Copyright and Intermediate Users’ Rights, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 67, 69-71 (1999); Laura G. 
Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 
720-21 (1995). 
 5. Consideration of whether it would be desirable for fair use to be more available in situations 
in which the defendant has prepared a derivative work is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
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right, will instead be judged as noninfringing fair uses.6  As Professor Paul 
Goldstein’s treatise notes, “On principle, the rule [weighing transformativeness in 
favor of fair use] threatens to undermine the balance that Congress struck in section 
106(2)’s derivative rights provision to give copyright owners exclusive control over 
transformative works to the extent these works borrow copyrightable expression 
from the copyrighted work.”7 
At least one recent district court decision highlights the potential interaction 
between fair use transformativeness and the scope of the derivative work right and 
seems to bear out commentators’ fears.  Clean Flicks v. Soderbergh involved a 
claim of infringement by motion picture copyright owners against businesses that 
produced and rented DVD copies of popular movies that had been “altered by 
deleting ‘sex, nudity, profanity and gory violence.’”8  The court explained how the 
principal defendant produced its versions: “The editing techniques used include 
redaction of audio content, replacing the redaction with ambient noise, ‘blending’ 
of audio and visual content to provide transition of edited scenes, cropping, fogging 
or the use of a black bar to obscure visual content.”9 
The copyright owners’ claims against the defendants included claims of 
unauthorized preparation of derivative works—“the edited versions of their films,” 
while the defendants argued that they had not produced derivative works.10  At the 
same time, the defendants asserted that their activities were fair use—and argued 
that the transformativeness of their use should weigh in favor of their fair use 
claim, while the plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ edited versions were not 
transformative for purposes of the first fair use factor.11 
The district court, facing what it saw as the litigants’ “inconsistent positions,” 
viewed the question of transformativeness as the same in the derivative work and 
fair use contexts.  In analyzing the first fair use factor, the court concluded “[t]here 
is nothing transformative about the edited copies,” because the defendants “add 
nothing new” to the movies and instead merely “delete scenes and dialogue.”12  
The court then held that “because the infringing copies of these movies are not 
used in a transformative manner, they are not derivative works and do not violate 
§ 106(2).”13  Regardless of whether the court was correct that the defendant’s use 
 
 6. How much of a concern this should be depends in part on how much emphasis courts put on 
transformativeness in reaching the ultimate conclusion on fair use. For many ordinary derivative works 
(that is, works with no particular critical or commentary element in their transformation), courts might 
well find that the unauthorized production of such works has a sufficiently negative effect on the well-
established markets for producing such derivative works (such as cover recordings of musical 
compositions, films based on novels, stage musicals based on films, etc.) that the overall weighing of the 
statutory factors results in denying the fair use claim, even if the defendant has made a highly 
transformative derivative work. 
 7. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 12.49 (3d ed. 2005 & 2007 Supp.). 
 8. Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo. 2006). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1240-41. 
 11. Id. at 1241. 
 12. Id.  It is not clear that one cannot “add” some “new expression, meaning or message” within 
the Campbell Court’s view of transformativeness by creative deletion of portions of a copyrighted work. 
 13. Id. at 1242 (emphasis added). 
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was not transformative for fair use analysis or that it did not constitute the 
preparation of a derivative work, its view that because a use is not transformative 
under the first fair use factor it therefore is not a use that produced a derivative 
work seems clearly incorrect. 
A “sanitized” version of a film certainly might not be transformative for fair use 
purposes, or might be only very weakly so, because bleeping certain words in the 
film’s dialogue or using a black bar or blurring to obscure some nudity in certain 
frames might, in some cases, not really add any new purpose, character, expression, 
meaning or message to the film, or might only add the message (perhaps already 
obvious from the unaltered film) that the movie contains some content that some 
people find objectionable.14  At the same time, it seems possible that the edited 
version, even if not transformative for fair use analysis, might well constitute a 
derivative work, particularly if the amount of alteration of objectionable dialogue, 
or of images of violence or nudity, is significant.15  After all, the definition of 
derivative work specifically includes the categories of abridgement and 
condensation, demonstrating that removing portions of a work (possibly with the 
addition of only minimal material to tie the remaining portions together) can indeed 
be a sufficient recasting, transforming, or adapting to result in the creation of a 
derivative work. 
The conclusion that, because the defendant’s editing of the plaintiff’s films was 
not transformative for fair use analysis, the edited versions were therefore not 
derivative works, thus seems to diminish the scope of the derivative work right.  
Presumably, under the Clean Flicks view, determining whether someone has 
prepared a derivative work might now involve not just deciding whether the work 
that she has prepared meets the statutory definition of a derivative work, but also 
deciding whether her use of the underlying work is “transformative” in the fair use 
sense.  Under this view, someone who, for example, prepares a sanitized version of 
a public domain film would apparently not be entitled to a copyright in that new 
version, regardless of the originality of her contributions to it, because such a 
version does not constitute a derivative work, because it is not transformative as 
that term is used in fair use analysis.  This seems contrary to the general view of 
what constitutes a derivative work. 
B.  CIRCUIT COURT TREATMENT OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS AND DERIVATIVE 
WORKS 
In order to explore whether the Clean Flicks approach is aberrational or reflects 
a more generalized view, it is useful to survey the larger landscape of fair use 
 
 14. In addition, as discussed in Part II infra, to the extent that the transformativeness of the 
defendant’s purpose is relevant, a court might well find that the sanitized versions did not have a 
transformative purpose but instead were designed to entertain the viewer (albeit without some 
potentially offensive content) in the same way as the original movie and by conveying essentially the 
same expression. 
 15. Cf. Maljack Productions, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1416, 1426-28 (C.D.Cal 1997) 
(finding pan-and-scan version of film a copyrightable derivative work), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Batjac Productions, Inc. v. Goodtimes Home Video, 160 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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decisions.  This Essay reviews all of the published circuit court opinions applying 
the statutory fair use analysis between the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell 
and the end of 2007, and considers how those opinions dealt with the relationship 
between transformativeness in fair use analysis and the scope of the derivative 
work right.  I identified 37 cases in this period, involving 41 published opinions, in 
which circuit courts reviewed substantive fair use claims and offered some 
discussion of the first statutory factor, or the derivative work right, or both.16  This 
review indicates that, to date, at least appellate courts have not applied fair use 
transformativeness in ways that significantly implicate the scope of the copyright 
owner’s derivative work right. 
1.  Express Discussion of the Fair Use-Derivative Work Relationship 
Only one appellate decision since Campbell has expressly addressed the 
relationship between derivative works as works that have “transformed” the 
expression in an underlying work and the “transformativeness” relevant to fair use 
analysis.17  In Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, the 
defendants had produced The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a book of 643 trivia questions 
testing the reader’s knowledge of the characters and events in the plaintiff’s popular 
television sitcom.18  An extended trivia test based upon a television show would 
seem to constitute a derivative work based on the show, and in concluding that the 
trivia questions infringed the show’s copyright, the court implied, fairly strongly, 
that Carol Publishing had violated the plaintiff’s section 106(2) right.19  In 
reviewing the defendants’ fair use claim, the court’s discussion of 
transformativeness focused almost entirely on its view that the defendants had not 
used the plaintiff’s work for a transformative purpose (such as criticism, 
commentary, parody, scholarship, teaching, or research), but had instead used it 
merely for the same entertainment purpose for which the original TV episodes were 
intended.20  The court concluded that the defendants’ book had “transformed 
Seinfeld’s expression into trivia quiz book form with little, if any, transformative 
 
 16. I began with the list of circuit court cases after Campbell and through 2005 that Barton Beebe 
identified in his excellent recent empirical survey as making substantial use of the Section 107 factors.  
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 549, 623 (2008).  I then used Westlaw to update that list, using the same methodology described 
by Beebe, through to the end of 2007.  I eliminated any opinions that did not analyze a substantive fair 
use claim, as well as any published opinions that were superseded by later published opinions in the 
same case.  I also eliminated one opinion that discussed the first factor, but only considered the 
commercial nature of the work, and left the question of transformativeness unaddressed. 
 17. One other opinion considered the relationship between derivative works and fair use more 
generally.  See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002), discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 39-44. 
 18. Castle Rock Ent’mt, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 19. Id. at 139 (finding support in Horgan v. Macmillian, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986), a case 
involving derivative work claims); id. at 140 (noting that “total concept and feel” test for infringement is 
unhelpful, and that “many ‘derivative’ works of different genres, in which copyright owners have 
exclusive rights, see 17 U.S.C. § 106, may have a different total concept and feel from the original 
work”). 
 20. Id. at 142-43. 
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purpose” and weighed this factor against a finding of fair use.21 
The court articulated a number of at least minimally creative expressive 
elements that the defendants had contributed to their trivia quiz book, reinforcing 
the view that that the defendants may have produced a derivative work.22  But the 
court also immediately sought to clear up “a potential source of confusion in our 
copyright jurisprudence over the use of the term ‘transformative,’” arising from the 
fact that the definition of “derivative work” encompassed works that “transformed” 
some underlying work.23  “Although derivative works that are subject to the 
author’s copyright transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, 
such works—unlike works of fair use—take expression for purposes that are not 
‘transformative.’”24  The court thus appeared to expressly reject a view that any 
transformation involved in the preparation of a derivative work would necessarily 
count toward making that preparation a “transformative” use for purposes of fair 
use analysis.  The court clearly viewed fair-use transformativeness as distinct from 
the transformation that produces a derivative work, and saw the former as focused 
on the purpose of the use. 
2.  Defendants’ Uses that Involve a Derivative Work 
a.  Expressly Acknowledged Preparation of a Derivative Work 
At least five cases are notable for the lack of any discussion of the relationship 
between what constitutes a derivative work and what constitutes transformativeness 
for fair use, despite the fact that the courts in those cases expressly found that a 
defendant had prepared (or could be found to have prepared) a derivative work 
based on the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.  In each case, the court apparently did 
not view the transformation wrought by the defendant in creating the derivative 
work as even relevant to the analysis of whether the defendant’s use was 
transformative for purposes of the first fair use factor, and certainly did not view 
the preparation of the derivative work as itself constituting transformativeness that 
weighed in favor of fair use. 
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books, the defendants, in a book called 
The Cat NOT in the Hat, told the story of the O.J. Simpson murder trial in the style 
of the Dr. Seuss children’s classic The Cat in the Hat.25  Seuss claimed that the 
defendants had infringed his derivative work right, and the work certainly seems to 
be a classic example of a derivative work.26  The defendants took the main 
 
 21. Id. at 143. 
 22. The court recognized that creative expression was required to turn a “fact” depicted in the TV 
show into question-and-answer form, to create incorrect multiple-choice answers, and to arrange the 
questions into increasing levels of difficulty.  Id.  The court might also have pointed to the selection 
involved in deciding which of the many occurrences in the 84 episodes from which the book drew 
should be the basis for the questions. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 26. Id. at 1397. 
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character from the copyrighted work and placed that character in a new setting in 
order to tell a new story in a similar visual and literary style.  The defendants’ book 
was clearly based upon the Seuss work, and appears to have recast, transformed, 
and adapted expression from it.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
decision that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on its prima facie infringement 
claim.  As to the issue of whether the use was transformative for fair use analysis, 
the Ninth Circuit posed the question by reference to Campbell’s discussion of that 
factor but limited its analysis entirely to whether the work was a parody of the 
Seuss work or was instead a satire.  Deciding that the defendants aimed any 
commentary and criticism in their work not at Dr. Seuss or his works, and that 
therefore the defendants had produced a satire and not a parody, the court 
concluded that there was “no effort to create a transformative work with ‘new 
expression, meaning, or message.’”27  In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the defendant 
apparently had produced a derivative work, but whatever transformation of content 
the defendant had engaged in was apparently not at all relevant to whether the 
defendant’s use was “transformative” for purposes of the fair use analysis.  As a 
result, the court found that the first factor weighed against the fair use claim.  The 
defendant had clearly altered the content of the original work and offered a 
different message, but the court concluded that these changes were not 
“transformative” because they did not produce a parody. 
In Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
counterclaim plaintiff, the owner of the copyright in the videogame Duke Nukem 
 
 27. Id. at 1401.  That conclusion seems to be far more nonsensical than the average Dr. Seuss 
work, given that the court had just spent a page explaining how the defendants “broadly mimic Dr. 
Seuss’ characteristic style” in order to “retell the Simpson tale” rather than “the substance and content of 
The Cat in the Hat.” Id.  Whatever the relative impact that parodic and satiric purpose have on fair use, 
The Cat NOT in the Hat surely, in comparison to the Dr. Seuss original, “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message,” 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, and is therefore transformative to some degree under any fair reading of the 
Campbell Court’s meaning of that term.  Presumably then, this was in reality a case where the defendant 
had prepared a derivative work and had used it for a transformative purpose, so that the court should 
have found transformativeness.  Perhaps the transformativeness of the satire would have weighed less 
heavily in favor of fair use than if the work had been a parody, and the ultimate conclusion based on all 
the factors might still have been that the use was unfair, but the court’s transformativeness analysis 
seems to be a substantial misreading of Campbell.  The decision simply gives transformativeness too 
crabbed a reading. 
I think that Diane Zimmerman’s explanation for this case (and others like it) makes sense.  See Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, The Less They Seem “Transformed”: Some 
Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251 (1998).  She argued in 1998 that judges at 
the time felt obliged to analyze a work’s transformativeness, and that a finding that a use was 
transformative was difficult, in the wake of Campbell, to reconcile with an ultimate finding that the use 
was not fair, so courts “engaged in so much twisting and turning to avoid the seemingly obvious 
conclusion that, whatever else might have been troubling in the defendants’ cases, the uses in question 
were at least ‘transformative’ [and] clearly did provide the public with a new or substantially reworked 
product.”  Id. at 259-60.  See also Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use 
Doctrine After Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2002) (“Because post-Campbell courts sometimes 
seem to assume that a finding of transformativeness is the golden ring that leads to success on a fair use 
claim, these courts often go to great lengths to deny the at least arguable transformativeness of works 
before them.”). 
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3D, was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim that defendant Micro Star’s 
distribution of additional levels for use with the videogame infringed on 
FormGen’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on its game.28  The 
court ruled that the additional game levels told stories that were sequels to the story 
FormGen told in the basic game, and that this infringed the derivative work right.29  
In reviewing Micro Star’s fair use claim, however, the court discussed 
transformativeness only in a single footnote, in which it concluded, with no further 
analysis, that the additional game levels “can hardly be described as transformative; 
anything but.”30  Although the court had engaged in extensive discussion of 
whether the works distributed by Micro Star constituted unauthorized derivative 
works, in discussing the transformativeness of Micro Star’s use, it never even 
adverted to the transformation of the underlying work involved in preparing the 
derivatives. 
In Greenberg v. National Geographic Soc’y, the defendants used one plaintiff’s 
copyrighted photograph of a diver, which had previously appeared on the cover of 
defendant’s National Geographic magazine, in a computer animation that appeared 
on a CD-ROM collection, The Complete National Geographic.31  The animation 
was a 25-second sequence in which 10 magazine covers appeared, one at a time, 
and then morphed into the next cover in the sequence.32  The court ruled that the 
animated sequence constituted a derivative work based on the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted photograph.33  In the very next paragraph, the court considered the 
defendant’s fair use claim: 
The use of the diver photograph far transcended a mere reprinting or borrowing of the 
work.  As explained above, it became an integral part of a larger, new collective work.  
The use to which the diver photograph was put was clearly a transformative use.  The 
[animated s]equence reflects the transformation of the photograph as it is faded into 
and out of the preceding and following photographs (after having turned the 
horizontal diver onto a vertical axis).  The [s]equence also integrates the visual 
presentation with an audio presentation consisting of copyrightable music.  The 
resultant moving and morphing visual creation transcends a use that is fair within the 
context of § 107.34 
The court’s discussion gives no indication that the fact that the defendant had 
prepared a derivative work meant that the issue of transformativeness in factor one 
should weigh in favor of fair use.  While the court recounted alterations the 
defendant had made, it did not view those alterations as having produced 
“transformativeness” that would favor a finding that the defendant’s derivative 
work was a fair use.  In fact, the court seems to have concluded, to the contrary, 
that the transformation made by the defendant went beyond the level of 
 
 28. Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 29. Id. at 1112. 
 30. Id. at 1113 n.6. 
 31. Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 32. Id. at 1269. 
 33. Id. at 1274. 
 34. Id. at 1274-75. 
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transformativeness allowed under fair use, and seems to have weighed the 
defendants’ transformation against, rather than in favor of, fair use. 
Finally, in Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, the court considered fair use in 
the context of the plaintiff’s work.35  The plaintiff had created a test preparation 
manual that incorporated material from a handbook published by the organization 
that administered the test in question.  When the plaintiff sued a competitor for 
allegedly copying portions of the plaintiff’s manual in producing the competitor’s 
own test preparation course materials, the court considered whether the plaintiff’s 
manual was itself an unauthorized derivative work based on the testing 
organization’s handbook, such that the copyright in the plaintiff’s manual would be 
invalid.36  In a two-page discussion of the question, the court concluded that 
genuine issues of fact existed, precluding a determination as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff had not infringed on the testing organization’s derivative work right.37  
The court then turned to the plaintiff’s claim that even if her manual was an 
unauthorized derivative work based on the testing organization’s handbook, it did 
not use any copyrighted material unlawfully (and thus the copyright in the manual 
was not invalid) because any copying from the handbook was fair use.  Despite the 
fact that the court had to evaluate the fair use claim only because of the possibility 
that the plaintiff had created an otherwise infringing derivative work, the court 
never mentioned the issue of whether, and to what extent, the plaintiff’s use was 
transformative, let alone consider whether any transformation by the plaintiff in 
producing her derivative work was relevant (and if so, how) to the evaluation of 
transformativeness.38  This hardly suggests a view in which any preparation of a 
derivative work automatically counts as transformative under factor one, and 
weighs in favor of fair use. 
In one additional case involving a defendant who claimed fair use in the 
production of a derivative work, the court considered the fair use claim without any 
discussion of the first statutory factor or the transformativeness of the use.  In Ty, 
Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., the court reviewed whether the copyright 
owner of Beanie Babies stuffed animals (copyrightable as sculptural works) was 
entitled to summary judgment on its infringement claim against a defendant 
publisher that had produced a series of books that included photographs of the 
copyrighted toys.39  The defendant “concede[d] that photographs of Beanie Babies 
are derivative works” within the scope of Ty’s section 106(2) right, but asserted 
 
 35. Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 36. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in 
which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used 
unlawfully.”). Although the court discusses the issue in terms of whether the plaintiff’s “copyright” 
would be invalid, in fact, protection would still extend to all parts of the work that were original to 
plaintiff and that did not unlawfully use the underlying copyrighted material. 
 37. Mulcahy, 386 F.3d at 852-54. 
 38. See id. at 854-55. The court’s discussion centered entirely on the fourth factor, which it 
described as “undoubtedly the single most important element” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)), and concluded that genuine factual issues precluded a 
decision as a matter of law that Mulcahy’s use was fair. 
 39. 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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that its use of the photos qualified as fair use.40 
In analyzing the fair use claim, the court did not take into account any 
transformation involved in producing the derivative photographs.  This is perhaps 
not surprising, since the court expressly chose not to analyze the fair use claim by 
discussion of the statutory factors.  Indeed, the opinion characterized the first factor 
as “empty” (except for a preference for noncommercial educational use) and made 
no reference to the Campbell Court’s emphasis on transformativeness. The court 
did, at one point, glancingly characterize “transformative” use as discussed in 
Campbell as equivalent to complementary, as opposed to substitutional, copying.41  
In the court’s view, “copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the 
sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a 
substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs 
or screws), or for derivative works from the copyrighted work, is not fair use.”42  In 
conceptualizing “transformative” copying as “complementary” copying, then, the 
court took into account the fact that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work, and extended the concept 
of “substitutional” copying to derivatives as well as to originals.  Thus, while the 
court stated that photographs of Beanie Babies were not substitutes for the toys, 
they are derivative works “for which there may be a separate demand” that the 
copyright owner can exploit.43  Thus, the court did not seem to treat the mere fact 
that the defendant had to some degree transformed the copyrighted works (at least 
by taking two-dimensional photos of three-dimensional objects) as at all relevant to 
determining whether the photos were fair use.44 
In sum, in cases in which the court found that an alleged infringer had 
violated—or could be found to have violated—the derivative work right, courts 
showed no inclination to treat the transformation involved in the preparation of the 
derivative work as “transformativeness” in analyzing the first fair use factor.45 This 
suggests that, at least to date, circuit courts have not used Campbell’s view that 
transformative uses are more entitled to fair use to contract the scope of the 
copyright owner’s derivative work right by viewing derivative works as 
necessarily, or even generally, transformative uses. 
 
 40. Id. at 515. 
 41. See id. at 518. 
 42. Id. at 517 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 43. Id. at 519. 
 44. Instead of focusing on the transformation of content by the defendant in producing the photos, 
the court focused on how the defendant used the resulting photos. In essence, the court suggested that 
what the defendant did with the photographs would determine whether fair use would excuse what it 
viewed as the otherwise infringing preparation of the derivative works. If one of the defendant’s books 
was merely “a collection of photographs of Beanie Babies,” the court suggested, that book would not 
qualify as fair use.  Id. at 519. On the other hand, if a book were a collectors’ guide to Beanie Babies—
which the court viewed as not coming within the copyright owner’s exclusive section 106(2) right—then 
the use of the derivative photos might be fair, if it is necessary to produce a marketable collectors’ guide.  
See id. at 520-21. 
 45. Indeed, the courts that articulated a conclusion as to the weight of the first factor in these 
cases found that it weighed against, rather than for, fair use. 
REESE FINAL V4 5/28/2008  8:00:39 PM 
2008] TRANSFORMATIVENESS AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT 111 
b. Apparent Preparation of a Derivative Work 
In two cases, defendants used copyrighted works in producing new works of a 
type expressly listed in the statute as derivative works, although the courts never 
expressly identified the defendants’ uses as violations of Section 106(2). In Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, the defendant produced English-
language “abstracts” of the plaintiff’s Japanese-language news stories.46  The court 
characterized most of the abstracts as “direct, if not word-for-word, translations of 
the Nikkei articles, edited only for clarity.”47  The statutory list of examples of 
derivative works begins with “translation,” so the defendant’s abstracts would 
certainly seem to qualify as derivative works.  Similarly, in Zomba Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., the defendant produced its own recordings of 
musicians performing the plaintiff’s copyrighted musical works (to which 
recordings the defendant also added the text of the plaintiff’s lyrics, in order to 
make the recordings usable for karaoke), and “sound recording” is one of the 
categories listed in the statutory definition of derivative works. 48 
In each of these cases, however, even though the defendant’s use fell squarely 
within a derivative work category, the court did not find that the transformation 
involved in preparing the derivative work constituted transformativeness for fair 
use analysis.  In Nihon, the court said that the abstracts “are ‘not in the least 
“transformative”’” and that the “direct translations . . . added almost nothing 
new.”49  And in Zomba, the court noted that the defendant’s musicians “did not 
change the words or music” and that “a facsimile recording of a copyrighted 
composition adds nothing new to the original and accordingly has virtually no 
transformative value.”50  Once again then, these cases indicate that courts do not 
interpret “transformativeness” in the fair use analysis as encompassing any and all 
transformation involved in the preparation of a derivative work.  One can produce a 
translation or a sound recording—paradigmatic examples of derivative works—and 
still be found not to have made any “transformative” use that would weigh in favor 
of fair use. 
Two other cases involve defendants who fairly clearly created derivative works, 
although the courts never expressly acknowledged that fact and their uses did not 
fall into one of the categories named in the definition of derivative works.  In 
 
 46. 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 47. Id. at 71. 
 48. 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 49. 166 F.3d at 72 (quoting the district court opinion). The court concluded that the first factor 
weighed “strongly” against fair use. 
 50. 491 F.3d at 582 (internal quotations omitted). The court found that the first factor weighed 
against finding fair use. To the extent that the court’s view is premised on no change in words or music, 
its conclusion that a sound recording adds nothing new to the underlying musical work seems to 
undervalue the contributions of the recording’s musicians and vocalists, as anyone who has ever listened 
to two different but faithful interpretations of the same musical work by different recording artists can 
attest. To the extent that the court meant “a facsimile recording” to indicate that the defendant’s 
recorded version of the plaintiff’s musical work was intended to sound, and succeeded in sounding, just 
like someone else’s prior recorded version of that work, the court’s view that the recording added 
nothing new seems somewhat more defensible. 
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the defendant’s work was Alice Randall’s 
The Wind Done Gone (TWDG).51  Her novel was “a critique of [Gone With The 
Wind’s] depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South” that borrowed 
characters, scenes, dialog, and other elements from Margaret Mitchell’s novel in 
order to, in part, retell the story from a critical vantage point.52  Although the court, 
in determining that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing a prima 
facie infringement of the copyright in Gone With The Wind (GWTW), never stated 
whether the defendant violated the derivative work right (as opposed to only the 
reproduction right), Randall’s novel seems highly likely to qualify as a derivative 
work, just as other sequels to existing novels constitute derivative works, given that 
she used Mitchell’s characters and settings to tell a “new story.”53  In considering 
the defendant’s fair use claim, the court never expressly discussed The Wind Done 
Gone’s status as a derivative work, but it offered the following evaluation of 
transformativeness: 
The issue of transformation is a double-edged sword in this case. On the one hand, the 
story of [TWDG’s main character] Cynara and her perception of the events in TWDG 
certainly adds new “expression, meaning, [and] message” to GWTW. From another 
perspective, however, TWDG’s success as a pure work of fiction depends heavily on 
copyrighted elements appropriated from GWTW to carry its own plot forward.54 
The court’s language suggests that it did not necessarily view the mere 
transformation of expression from the copyrighted work as qualifying the 
defendant’s use as transformative.  Indeed, while the court did find that the 
transformativeness of Randall’s work weighed in favor of finding her use fair, that 
conclusion rested almost entirely on TWDG’s critical, parodic attack on the 
viewpoints expressed in Mitchell’s novel, and on the fact that Randall “fully 
employed those conscripted elements from GWTW to make war against it.”55  
Transformativeness, in the court’s view, rested not in the fact that Randall had 
transformed the underlying work (and likely produced a derivative work), but in 
how she transformed the original and what kind of derivative (a parodic critique) 
she produced. 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. offers a very similar example.  The 
defendant, as part of a movie ad campaign, had meticulously recreated the 
plaintiff’s photograph of a nude, pregnant Demi Moore, but had substituted the 
 
 51. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 52. Id. at 1259. The appeals court agreed with the district court’s characterization that 
“particularly in its first half, TWDG is largely ‘an encapsulation of [GWTW] [that] exploit[s] its 
copyrighted characters, story lines, and settings as the palette for the new story.’” Id. at 1267 (quoting 
the district court opinion). 
 53. Id. at 1267.  See also id. at 1270 (“Approximately the last half of TWDG tells a completely 
new story that, although involving characters based on GWTW characters, features plot elements found 
nowhere within the covers of GWTW.”). 
 54. Id. at 1269 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
 55. Id. at 1270-71. Judge Marcus’s concurrence would have weighed the transformativeness of 
the defendant’s work more decisively in favor of fair use, again based largely on the critical nature of 
the work.  See id. at 1280. 
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mischievously smirking face of actor Leslie Nielsen.56  Again, the defendant’s 
photograph seems likely to qualify as a derivative work, although the court never 
discussed which right the new photo violated.  And again, in evaluating 
transformativeness under the first fair use factor, the court’s discussion focused 
entirely on the critical and parodic nature of the ad, without any reference to the 
defendant’s alterations of the original content except to the extent that those 
alterations supported the view of the ad as a parodic comment.57  The court 
concluded that the ad’s transformativeness caused the first factor to weigh 
“significantly” toward fair use, and the court’s ultimate conclusion was that the use 
was fair. 
In sum, in the nine instances in which appellate courts considered a defendant’s 
use that expressly or fairly clearly involved the preparation of a derivative work 
based on the copyright owner’s original, no opinion suggested that the fact that the 
defendant’s work was a derivative made the defendant’s use transformative for fair 
use analysis.  Indeed, in five of the nine cases, the courts found that the use was not 
fair or that the defendant was not likely to prevail on the merits of its fair use claim 
(and in the three of these five cases in which the court expressed a conclusion as to 
the first fair-use factor, the court in all three cases found that the factor weighed 
against fair use).58  In two cases, the court found a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether the use was fair (expressing no view as to the first factor), and remanded 
the case for further consideration, without suggesting that the defendant’s 
preparation of a derivative work was relevant to the transformativeness analysis.59  
Only in Suntrust and Leibovitz did the court find that the defendant’s derivative 
work was a fair use and that the use was transformative, but that conclusion was 
based in both cases principally on the critical, parodic nature of the use, and not 
merely on the defendant’s act of transforming content from the underlying original. 
3.  Likely or Possible Preparation of Derivative Work 
In twelve more cases, the defendant arguably had engaged in some 
transformation of the content of the plaintiff’s work that might constitute the 
preparation of a derivative work, though it is difficult to know for sure given the 
uncertain scope and boundaries of the derivative work right.  But in each case the 
court never indicated whether it viewed the defendant as having prepared a 
derivative work or instead having violated some other exclusive right.  In none of 
these cases did the court suggest in its fair use discussion that the defendant had 
created a derivative work and that such creation was relevant to the question of 
whether the defendant’s use was transformative. 
 
 56. 137 F.3d 109, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 57. See id. at 114-15. 
 58. The court found the use not to be fair in Dr. Seuss, Micro Star, Nihon, Greenberg, and 
Zomba, and expressly found that the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use in the first three. 
 59. Ty reversed the district court’s summary judgment that the use of the Beanie Babies photos 
was not fair, and Mulcahy reversed the district court’s summary judgment that the plaintiff’s use of a 
third-party’s work in producing the copyrighted work that she alleged the defendant had infringed was a 
fair use. 
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In nine of these cases, the defendant had taken only excerpts from the plaintiff’s 
work and had incorporated those excerpts in the defendant’s own, larger work.60  In 
five of these cases, the court found that the defendant’s use was, or was likely to be 
fair.  The uses included quotations from an unpublished novel included in an 
unpublished scholarly article about the novel that was presented at an academic 
conference, quotations from a group’s confidential training manual used to support 
the analysis in a report arguing that the group used mind control techniques, 
incorporation of a portion of a photographic fashion magazine ad in a collage 
painting commenting on “the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media,” 
the use of screen shots of scenes from the plaintiff’s videogame in the defendant’s 
comparative advertisements for its emulator software, and the inclusion of “a 
couple of seconds” from plaintiff’s copyrighted film of a news event in a montage 
used as the introduction for a television news program.61  In discussing fair use 
transformativeness, none of the cases mentioned whether the defendant had 
produced a derivative work, and half of them gave no discussion of whether the 
defendant had, in the court’s view, altered the content of the plaintiff’s work in any 
way that could be considered transformative.62 
In five of these “incorporated excerpt” cases, the court found that the 
defendant’s use was not, or was not likely to be fair.  These uses included 
incorporating film, still photos, and music into a 16-hour video biography of Elvis 
Presley; broadcasting 30 seconds of a 280-second film of a breaking news event as 
part of a local newscast with voice-over commentary; making and showing a TV 
sitcom episode with plaintiff’s copyrighted poster as set decoration in the 
background, at least partly visible in at least nine shots for a total of only 27 
seconds; reproducing substantial excerpts from scholarly works in compilations of 
excerpts as student readers for use in university courses; and using a few seconds of 
 
 60. Although there are only nine of these cases, there are five findings of fair use and five 
findings of no fair use, because one case considers two different uses by the defendant and determines 
that one is fair and one is not.  See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002), 
amended and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
 61. Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 
364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (defendant Koons 
“included in the painting only the legs and feet from the photograph, discarding the background of the 
airplane cabin and the man’s lap on which the legs rest.  Koons inverted the orientation of the legs so 
that they dangle vertically downward above the other elements of [his painting] rather than slant upward 
at a 45-degree angle as they appear in the photograph.  He added a heel to one of the feet and modified 
the photograph’s coloring.”); Sony Computer Entm’t Am. v. Bleem, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000); CBS 
Broad., 305 F.3d at 929 (CourtTV “incorporated the brick-throwing footage into the introductory 
montage for its show ‘Prime Time Justice,’ which used a stylized orange clock design superimposed 
over a grainy, tinted, monochromatic video background. The background changed as the ‘hands’ of the 
clock revolved; LANS’s copyrighted video was in the background for a couple of seconds, one 360° 
sweep of the clock.”). 
 62. Only CBS Broadcasting and Blanch discuss how the defendants altered the content of the 
plaintiff’s work, and the latter case, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 93-96, seems to mention 
the changes in content primarily to support the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s purpose was 
transformative. All the cases, however, discuss whether the purpose of the defendant’s use was 
transformative, an issue considered infra Part II. 
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plaintiff’s copyrighted film of an important news event as part of television ads 
promoting the defendant TV network’s coverage of the trial of two people involved 
in that event.63 Again, in discussing fair use transformativeness, none of the cases 
mentioned whether the defendant had produced a derivative work.  Three of the 
cases indicate that the defendant made some alteration to the content of the 
plaintiff’s work but that the alterations were merely “mechanical” or added nothing 
new, and therefore were not transformative.64  The same is true of one additional 
case in which the defendant made one or two excerpts (totaling two minutes) from 
the plaintiff’s full-length feature films but did not incorporate those excerpts in a 
larger work, and instead simply used the excerpts as a preview for the film; the 
court stated that the defendant’s previews did not “add significantly to [the 
plaintiff’s] original expression.”65 
Two other cases involved uses, other than “incorporated excerpts,” that might 
qualify as derivative works, though the courts never addressed that question 
expressly in their opinions.  The first case is On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., involving 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted “nonfunctional jewelry worn over the eyes in the manner 
of eyeglasses.”66  The defendant clothing store company produced an advertising 
photograph of seven young people “standing in a loose V formation staring at the 
camera with a sultry, pouty, provocative look,” with the central figure wearing the 
plaintiff’s eyewear.67  Incorporating a three-dimensional sculptural work in an 
artistic two-dimensional photograph may constitute a derivative work based on the 
sculptural work, although the court never stated whether The Gap infringed the 
plaintiff’s section 106(2) right.  In denying The Gap’s fair use claim, the court also 
did not mention the possibility that the use was in a derivative work, and found 
“nothing transformative” about The Gap’s photograph because it showed the 
plaintiff’s eyewear “being worn as eye jewelry in the manner it was made to be 
worn.”68  The court made no mention of the new content of the photograph in 
which the eyewear appeared. 
In the final case, Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, the defendant 
 
 63. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv. 
v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t 
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002), 
amended and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
 64. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1389; CBS Broad., 305 F.3d at 939; KCAL-TV Channel 9, 
108 F.3d at 1122. 
 65. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).  See also 
id. at 199 n.5 (“[I]t is not clear to us that the use of a copy—not accompanied by any creative expression 
on the part of the copier—as an advertisement for the original would qualify as a type of use intended to 
be recognized by the fair use doctrine.”). 
Although the district court in the case had concluded that the defendant’s previews violated the 
copyright owner’s derivative work right, the court did not reach the question of whether that conclusion 
was correct, as other, uncontested violations of the copyright were sufficient to sustain the judgment.  Id. 
at 197. 
 66. 246 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 67. Id. at 157. 
 68. Id. at 174. 
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produced 78 photos of Barbie dolls “in various absurd and often sexualized 
positions.”69  Many of the photos altered the content of the copyrighted Barbie doll, 
as they involved only parts of the doll (such as the “heads in a fondue pot” in 
“Fondue a la Barbie”) or “obscured or omitted [parts of the doll] depending on the 
angle at which the photos were taken and whether other objects obstructed a view” 
of the doll.70  The opinion, however, never addressed the question of whether the 
photos constituted derivative works of Mattel’s doll.  The court though, did 
conclude that the defendant’s use was transformative and that this 
transformativeness weighed heavily in favor of fair use, and ultimately found that 
the defendant’s use was fair. 
The cases in which the defendant transformed the content of the plaintiff’s work 
to some degree, and may have prepared a derivative work, thus present a mixed 
picture as to transformativeness: in about half the opinions, the use was found 
transformative, and in the other half it was not.  The courts’ discussions of the 
transformativeness factor in all of these cases, though, make clear that the courts 
did not consider whether the defendant had prepared a derivative work as important 
to evaluating the transformativeness of the defendant’s use in conducting the fair 
use analysis. 
4.  Unlikely Preparation of Derivative Work 
Finally, in thirteen cases, the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work fairly 
clearly did not involve the preparation of any derivative work.  Indeed, these cases 
involved little to no alteration of the content of the plaintiff’s work, but instead 
involved basically verbatim copying, usually of the entire work.  The uses included 
photocopying of scientific journal articles, loading computer software into random-
access memory in order to engage in computer service, making videocassette 
copies of news broadcasts for distribution to news service subscribers, transmitting 
live radio broadcasts over telephone lines, reprinting a religious tract in its entirety 
for a breakaway sect’s use, reprinting a public figure’s modeling photos in 
conjunction with a newspaper article on the controversy over the nudity in the 
photos, exchanging digital files of recorded music over a peer-to-peer network, 
posting online a municipality’s building code (which was identical to a privately 
authored model code), photocopying an unpublished autobiographical manuscript 
for submission as evidence in a child-custody dispute, producing smaller-scale and 
reduced-resolution “thumbnail” versions of images appearing on Web sites for use 
in operating an image search engine, and loading computer software on many more 
computer hard drives than permitted under the terms of the software license.71 
 
 69. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 70. Id. at 796, 804. 
 71. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. 
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 
987 (9th Cir. 1998); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); Worldwide Church 
of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News 
Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 
REESE FINAL V4 5/28/2008  8:00:39 PM 
2008] TRANSFORMATIVENESS AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT 117 
Not surprisingly, none of the opinions in these cases discusses the derivative 
work right or any transformation by the defendant of the content of the plaintiff’s 
work, and in nine of the cases, the defendant’s use was ruled not to be (or not likely 
to be) fair.72  Perhaps more surprisingly, though, in four cases courts found a 
defendant’s use transformative even though the defendant had clearly not created a 
derivative work, and had not significantly changed, transformed or altered the 
content of the plaintiff’s work in any way. 
In Núñez v. Caribbean International News Corp., Núñez, a photographer, took 
photos of Joyce Giraud, Miss Puerto Rico Universe 1997, for her modeling 
portfolio.73  “Giraud was naked or nearly naked in at least one of the photos,” 
which generated a good deal of controversy over whether that was appropriate.74  
Defendant’s newspaper El Vocero published three of the photos to accompany 
stories about the controversy, and Núñez sued for copyright infringement.  The 
newspaper printed the photos in their entirety, and although the court termed the 
newspaper’s version “a relatively poor reproduction,” it seems clear that the paper’s 
reproduction of the photos did not constitute a derivative work of Núñez’s 
copyrighted photos.75  Nonetheless, in affirming a finding of fair use, the First 
Circuit viewed El Vocero’s use as transformative. 
In Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the plaintiff sued the 
defendant over the reproduction of seven concert posters among the over 2000 
images included in a 480-page biography of the musical group the Grateful Dead, 
which consisted of a chronological timeline tracing the history of the group.76  The 
posters were reproduced in their entirety, and although they were reproduced at a 
significantly reduced size (“less than 1/20 the size of the original”) and as part of 
book pages that contained other images and text, this change in size and addition of 
accompanying material would not generally be viewed as creating a derivative 
work.77  The Second Circuit nonetheless affirmed the district court’s conclusion 
that the defendant’s use was transformative. 
Perhaps most famously in recent years, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit held that producing thumbnail versions 
of copyrighted images that appear on Web sites for the purpose of operating an 
image search engine is transformative for fair use analysis. Producing a smaller-
sized, reduced-resolution version of a copyrighted image by using an automated 
 
791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (not reaching the fair use issue); id. at 823-25 (Wiener, J., dissenting, 
addressing fair use); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Wall Data Inc. 
v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 72. In Veeck, the majority found that the defendant had not infringed and so did not reach the fair 
use claim; the dissenting opinion considered and rejected the fair use claim and would have found 
liability for infringement. In Worldwide Church of God and in Texaco, a dissenting opinion in each case 
would have found fair use. 
 73. 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 74. Id. at 21. 
 75. Id. at 24-25. 
 76. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 77. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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process is unlikely to constitute the preparation of a derivative work based upon the 
image (as opposed to the reproduction of the image)—and it certainly would not to 
the extent that some minimal creativity must be involved in the alterations made to 
an underlying work in order to produce a derivative work.78  The Ninth Circuit 
appears to have treated the search engine thumbnails as “making an exact copy” of 
the copyrighted work, rather than as producing a derivative.79  Nonetheless, the 
court viewed the creation of thumbnail versions as transformative. 
In all four of these cases, the court concluded that the defendant’s use was 
transformative (and, indeed, in each case the court ultimately concluded that the 
defendant’s use was fair), and seemed entirely unconcerned that the defendant’s use 
in each case did not transform the content of the plaintiff’s work sufficiently to 
create a derivative work (if it transformed the content at all).80 As with the cases 
discussed above in which the court found that the obvious derivative works created 
by the defendant were nonetheless not transformative for fair use analysis, these 
decisions strongly suggest that the circuit courts treat the question of 
transformativeness for fair use as separate and distinct from the question of 
transformation in the preparation of derivative works.  The concern expressed by 
commentators that considering transformativeness in fair use might affect the scope 
of the derivative work right appears so far not to have materialized. 
II.  TRANSFORMATIVENESS: PURPOSE AND CONTENT 
A.  TWO TYPES OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS: TRANSFORMING A WORK’S 
CONTENT AND USING A WORK FOR A TRANSFORMATIVE PURPOSE 
The review of circuit court cases in Part I shows that courts do not weigh the 
defendant’s preparation of a derivative work as necessarily constituting 
transformativeness in the fair use analysis.  Indeed, the cases generally do not seem 
to consider the defendant’s transformation of the underlying work’s content at all in 
the transformativeness inquiry.  This should be reassuring to those who worry that 
the Campbell Court’s emphasis on transformativeness might lead courts to find fair 
use too quickly in instances of ordinary derivative works.  (It may be less 
comforting to those who might have looked to Campbell’s approach to rein in to 
some degree what many view as an overly broad derivative works right.)  But it 
also seems a bit puzzling, since a defendant’s use that creates a derivative work 
does generally involve some transformation of the underlying work’s content, 
which would seem to be at least relevant to an evaluation of the degree to which the 
defendant’s use is transformative. 
A close reading of the appellate court fair use opinions that expressly address 
transformativeness suggests why those courts, in evaluating fair use, generally 
 
 78. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 79. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19). 
 80. Bond v. Blum, discussed infra note 101 and text accompanying note 104, fits this category as 
well, but that court never expressly discussed transformativeness in its opinion. 
REESE FINAL V4 5/28/2008  8:00:39 PM 
2008] TRANSFORMATIVENESS AND THE DERIVATIVE WORK RIGHT 119 
disregard whether the defendant has created a derivative work.  In assessing 
transformativeness, the courts generally emphasize the transformativeness of the 
defendant’s purpose in using the underlying work, rather than any transformation 
(or lack thereof) by the defendant of the content of the underlying work.81 
Transformativeness obviously could involve the extent to which the content of 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted work has been transformed or altered. Campbell itself 
involved a defendant’s use that had altered the plaintiff’s copyrighted original work 
by changing much of both the lyrics and the music of the song.  But 
transformativeness, at least as considered by the courts, includes another aspect: the 
use of a work for a completely different purpose than the purpose for which the 
copyright owner produced or used the original work.  As the Ninth Circuit has 
stated, “even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the 
copy serves a different function than the original work.”82  Again, the Campbell 
case also appears to have involved this kind of transformativeness, since the 
defendants there were borrowing from the underlying Orbison and Dees work for 
the transformative purpose of parodic criticism, and not merely for the 
entertainment purpose of the original.83 
B.  HOW COURTS EVALUATE THE TWO TYPES OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
Though transformativeness for fair use analysis could involve both the purpose 
for which the defendant is using the copyrighted work and the alterations that the 
defendant has made to that work’s content, the circuit court cases suggest that it is 
the former, rather than the latter, that really matters.  Thirty four of the appellate 
opinions, in 31 cases, expressly addressed transformativeness as part of the first-
factor analysis.  In all of those opinions, when the court found that the defendant 
had a transformative purpose for her use, the court found that the 
transformativeness inquiry weighed in favor of fair use, regardless of whether the 
court viewed the defendant as having transformed the actual content of the 
plaintiff’s work in any way.  Indeed, in all of the cases where transformativeness 
was found based on the defendant’s transformative purpose, the opinion’s ultimate 
conclusion was that the use was, or was likely to be, fair. 
By contrast, in all of the opinions in which the court determined that the 
defendant did not have a transformative purpose for her use (or in which the court’s 
 
 81. Judge Leval’s article, on which Campbell drew in its discussion of transformativeness, 
implicitly recognized both types of transformativeness, noting that the use “must employ the quoted 
matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original.” Pierre N. Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
 82. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Transforming the News: 
Copyright and Fair Use in News-Related Contexts, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 309, 325 (2005) 
(discussing “concept of ‘transformative purpose,’ which seems to consist of a different functional use of 
the original work than that intended by its creator, rather than some sort of reconfiguration of the work 
itself”). 
 83. I do not mean to suggest that these two types of transformativeness are the only relevant 
possibilities for fair use analysis, but they do seem to capture most of the discussion in the caselaw so 
far. 
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determination about transformative purpose was uncertain), the court decided that 
transformativeness did not weigh in favor of fair use, regardless of whether the 
defendant did or did not alter the content of the plaintiff’s work within its four 
corners. Again, in all of these cases, the opinion’s ultimate conclusion was that the 
use was not, or was not likely to be, fair. 
The following sections review these opinions in more detail, dividing them into 
four categories, based on the basic possibilities that arise in any particular case 
given the two different types of possible transformativeness: 
1. The defendant has transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work 
and is using it for a transformative purpose. 
2. The defendant has transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work 
but is not using it for a transformative purpose. 
3. The defendant has not transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
work but is using the copyrighted work for a transformative purpose. 
4. The defendant has not transformed the content of the plaintiff’s copyrighted 
work and is not using the copyrighted work for a transformative 
purpose.84 
 
C.  “DOUBLE OR NOTHING” TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
In the first category, since the defendant has engaged in both types of 
transformation, we would expect a court generally to find that the defendant’s use 
is transformative and that the transformativeness factor weighs in favor of the 
defendant’s fair use claim (though how strongly it does so may vary depending on 
how transformative the defendant’s use is).  Blanch v. Koons is an example of this 
situation.  In that case, the defendant had in fact altered the copyrighted work by 
copying only a portion of it, altering that portion, and incorporating that altered 
portion into a larger work of the defendant’s own.  But the Second Circuit’s 
discussion of the transformativeness of the defendant’s use focused almost 
exclusively on the transformative purpose of the use—using a fashion advertising 
image “as fodder for … commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of 
mass media”—and only very secondarily on the actual transformation of the work 
itself, which involved “changes of its colors, the background against which it is 
portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, [and] the objects’ details.”85  
As expected, the court found that the use was transformative and that this 
transformativeness weighed in favor of fair use. At least seven other opinions 
involved both types of transformation and led to the determination that the 
transformativeness of the use weighed in favor of fair use.86 
 
 84. In this analysis, I am excluding cases in which it is unclear what the defendant had done with 
respect to the content or the purpose, or unclear how the court viewed what the defendant had done. 
 85. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 86. In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), the defendants 
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In the fourth situation, since the defendant has not engaged in either type of 
transformation, we would similarly expect a court generally to find that the 
defendant’s use is not transformative and that the transformativeness factor, at the 
least, does not weigh in favor of the defendant’s fair use claim.87  Infinity Broad. 
Corp. v. Kirkwood is an example of this situation. The defendant there offered 
subscription access by telephone line to live radio broadcasts in remote markets, 
which it marketed for use by advertisers, talent scouts, and others in “auditioning 
on-air talent, verifying the broadcast of commercials, and listening to a station’s 
programming format and feel.”88  The defendant made no alteration to the 
broadcasts themselves. And while the court acknowledged that the defendant’s use 
of the broadcasts for “information” purposes was different from the copyright 
owner’s use of them for “entertainment” purposes and that “the difference in 
purpose tends to support Kirkwood’s fair use claim,” the court nevertheless 
concluded that Kirkwood’s different purpose was not a transformative one, because 
it involved “neither new expression, new meaning nor new message” and instead 
the defendant “merely repackages or republishes the original.”89  Thus, in the 
 
produced a copy, in “meticulous detail,” of plaintiff’s photograph of a pregnant Demi Moore but altered 
the photograph to feature Leslie Nielsen’s face, clearly altering the content of the work. 137 F.3d at 111-
12. The court also viewed the defendant’s photo as having a transformative purpose of commenting 
through parodic ridicule on the original. The court concluded that the use was transformative, and that 
its transformativeness weighed in favor of fair use.  Id at 114-15.  In Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain 
Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 796, 802-03  (9th Cir. 2003), involving 78 photos of Barbie dolls “in various 
absurd and often sexualized positions,” the court found that the photographer had a transformative 
purpose of parodying and commenting on Barbie and the “associations of beauty, wealth, and glamour” 
that Mattel had cultivated for Barbie. The court found that transformativeness weighed heavily in favor 
of fair use.  See also Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (majority 
and concurring opinions). 
One opinion involved multiple uses, and found transformativeness for those uses that involved both 
altered content and a transformative purpose.  L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 938-
42 (9th Cir. 2002) (use of seconds of video news footage in introductory montage for TV show), 
amended and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
In two cases, the extent of alteration of content by the defendant was less, generally involving 
excerpting portions of the work and including those portions as part of a larger new work that the 
defendant created. In those cases as well, if the court found the use was for a transformative purpose, it 
weighed the transformativeness factor in favor of fair use.  In NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 
(2d Cir. 2004), the defendants created and published two reports that “analyze[d] and critique[d]” the 
plaintiffs’ 265-page executive training seminar manual.  “The reports quote sections of the manual in 
support of their analyses and criticisms,” 364 F.3d at 475, thus transforming the content of the 
copyrighted manual by selecting excerpts from it and embedding those excerpts into a critical analysis 
of the copyrighted work. The court found that the defendants’ use of quotations “to support their critical 
analyses of the seminars is transformative,” apparently because the defendants’ use was for the purpose 
of criticism, comment, scholarship, or research, which was clearly a different purpose than that for 
which the plaintiffs were using the manual.  Id at 477.  See also Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 
F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998) (quotations from an unpublished novel included in an unpublished scholarly 
article about the novel that was presented at an academic conference). 
 87. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 12:48 (noting “rule that the ‘ordinary’ or 
‘nontransformative’ nature of copies should not weigh against fair use”) (emphasis added). 
 88. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 965 F. Supp. 553, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 89. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting district court 
and Leval, supra note 81, at 1111). 
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court’s view, Kirkwood had neither transformed the content of the works it used 
nor used them for a purpose that qualified as transformative.  Not surprisingly, the 
court found that Kirkwood’s use was not transformative and, in summing up the 
first fair use factor, found that it leaned against a finding of fair use.  At least eight 
other opinions involved uses that the court viewed as involving neither alteration of 
the content of the plaintiff’s work nor a transformative purpose.  In all those 
opinions (except for one dissenting opinion), the court found that the 
transformativeness inquiry weighed against a finding of fair use and the court 
ultimately found that the use was not, or was not likely to be, fair.90 
In cases in which the defendant has engaged in both types of transformation or 
in neither type, determining whether the defendant’s use is transformative in 
evaluating the fair use claim seems likely to be relatively straightforward.  After all, 
it will for the most part be hard to find a use transformative if it involves no 
transformation of either content or purpose, and hard to find a use not 
transformative if it involves transformation of both.  Many questions may remain as 
to how strongly the transformativeness, or lack thereof, should weigh in favor or 
against fair use, and as to the interaction of the court’s view of transformativeness 
with the other factors in reaching an ultimate conclusion as to fair use.  But these 
types of cases will be the simplest in terms of determining whether the use is 
transformative. 
D.  “EITHER-OR” TRANSFORMATION 
The more interesting question is how courts deal with categories 2 and 3, in 
which the defendant has made only one type of transformation. 
1.  Transformative Purpose Without Transformed Content 
At least four decided cases offer examples of the situation described in category 
3, in which the defendant appears to have used a copyrighted work without any 
substantive alteration or transformation of its content, but in which the defendant’s 
use was viewed by the court as being for a transformative purpose.  These cases are 
the four identified in Part I, in which the defendants did not prepare a derivative 
work but the court nonetheless found that the use was transformative for fair use 
purposes.  In each case, the court’s conclusion as to transformativeness rested on its 
 
 90. Judge Brunetti’s dissent in Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God 
disagrees with the majority on the ultimate ruling as to fair use, but does not clearly dispute the 
characterization of the use as not transformative.  He notes that a use “need not be transformative to 
qualify as fair use” and that any alteration of the content by the defendant “would defeat [the 
defendant’s] religious purpose because it believes that [the plaintiff’s work] is a divinely inspired text.” 
227 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (Brunetti, J., dissenting);  see also Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 
1995); L.A. News Service v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Worldwide 
Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (majority opinion); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004; Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, 293 F.3d 791, 808 (5th Cir. 2002) (Wiener, J., 
dissenting); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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view of the defendant’s transformative purpose, even in the absence of any 
transformation of the content of the plaintiff’s work. 
In Núñez, the First Circuit viewed the newspaper El Vocero’s use of the 
modeling photos of Miss Puerto Rico Universe as transformative: 
[P]laintiff’s photographs were originally intended to appear in modeling portfolios, 
not in the newspaper; the former use, not the latter, motivated the creation of the 
work.  Thus, by using the photographs in conjunction with editorial commentary, El 
Vocero did not merely “supersede[] the objects of the original creation[s],” but instead 
used the works for “a further purpose,” giving them a new “meaning, or message.”  
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164.  It is this transformation of the works into 
news—and not the mere newsworthiness of the works themselves—that weighs in 
favor of fair use under the first factor of § 107.91 
The court’s transformativeness analysis focused on the defendant’s 
transformative purpose.  While the photos were taken and distributed as “a 
publicity attempt to highlight Giraud’s abilities as a potential model,” the 
newspaper used them for a different purpose—informing its readers about the 
controversy over whether Miss Puerto Rico Universe had engaged in conduct 
unbecoming her position.92  The court also discussed the fact that the newspaper 
used the photos in conjunction with news articles about the controversy over the 
photos themselves, in order to report and explain the news story, indicating that 
reproducing an entire copyrighted work unchanged, in order to engage in 
commentary, criticism, or news reporting about the copyrighted work, can be 
transformative for fair use purposes, even though such use does not “transform” the 
copyrighted work’s content. 
In Bill Graham Archives, which involved the reproduction of seven concert 
posters among the over 2000 images included in a 480-page biography of the 
musical group the Grateful Dead, the posters were reproduced in their entirety 
(although at significantly reduced size).  The Second Circuit nonetheless concluded 
that the use was transformative, explaining that 
DK’s purpose in using the copyrighted images at issue in its biography of the Grateful 
Dead is plainly different from the original purpose for which they were created. 
Originally, each of BGA’s images fulfilled the dual purposes of artistic expression 
and promotion [of live concerts] . . . In contrast, DK used each of BGA’s images as 
historical artifacts to document and represent the actual occurrence of Grateful Dead 
concert events featured on Illustrated Trip’s timeline.93 
The court observed that in some cases, DK’s reproduction of a poster was 
accompanied by commentary specifically relating to the poster’s image (just as the 
reproduction in Núñez accompanied editorial commentary on the controversy over 
the photos).94  But the court rejected a view that specific commentary or criticism 
was necessary in order to render the use transformative.  It concluded that even 
 
 91. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 94. Id. at 609-610 & n.3. 
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where “the link between image and text is less obvious . . . the images still serve as 
historical artifacts graphically representing the fact of significant Grateful Dead 
concert events” and that “both types of uses fulfill DK’s transformative purpose of 
enhancing the biographical information in Illustrated Trip, a purpose separate and 
distinct from the original artistic and promotional purpose for which the images 
were created.”95  The court concluded that the defendant’s use was transformative 
even when the copied images were “standing alone” and unaccompanied by 
commentary, and that “DK was not required to discuss the artistic merits of the 
images” in order for its use to be deemed transformative.96  Thus, the court 
accepted that a defendant’s use can be transformative for fair use analysis even 
when it involves no alteration within the work’s four corners and is not 
accompanied by direct commentary on or criticism of the work, if the defendant’s 
use is for a sufficiently different purpose than the plaintiff’s original use for the 
work. 
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. and Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit 
viewed the creation of thumbnail versions for use in image search engines as 
transformative because the defendant’s purpose in creating and displaying the 
thumbnails was entirely “unrelated to any aesthetic purpose” for which the author 
had created and used the image.97  The search engine’s use in each case “serves a 
different function than [the copyright owner’s] use—improving access to 
information on the internet versus artistic expression.”98  The search engine 
companies “transform[ed] the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of 
information,” which “provides an entirely new use for the original work.”99  The 
court distinguished earlier cases finding that exact reproductions had not been 
transformative because “the resulting use of the copyrighted work in those cases 
was the same as the original use,” highlighting the very different purpose of the 
defendant’s use in the search engine cases.100 
In all of these cases, the defendant essentially used the plaintiff’s work without 
substantive alteration within the four corners of the work itself, but because the 
court viewed the use as for a transformative purpose, the court weighed the 
transformativeness factor in favor of fair use (and ultimately concluded that the use 
was indeed fair).101  Thus, a defendant’s use for a sufficiently transformative 
 
 95. Id. at 610. 
 96. Id. at 611. 
 97. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) 
 98. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818-19; see also Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. 
 99. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165. 
 100. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819. 
 101. Two other opinions follow this pattern.  One is a dissent.  Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 935 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (concluding that use of verbatim 
photocopies of articles in scientific journals for research purposes is transformative). 
The other opinion, Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003), involves the use of a verbatim copy 
for a different purpose, but the court never discussed transformativeness in its fair use analysis. The 
defendants introduced into evidence in a state child-custody case the plaintiff’s unpublished manuscript 
Self-Portrait of a Patricide: How I Got Away with Murder, in order to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s 
home was not suitable for children.  The manuscript purported to be a true story, told in “horrific detail,” 
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purpose can support a determination of transformativeness, even when the 
defendant has not altered any of the work’s content. 
It may seem surprising that courts sometimes find transformative purpose, and 
therefore transformativeness that favors fair use, even when the defendant has made 
no transformation of the content of the plaintiff’s work.  The appellate cases 
presenting this scenario, though, have so far all involved the defendant’s use of 
copyrighted still images—the modeling portfolio photos in Núñez, the concert 
posters in Bill Graham Archives, and the various photos located on the Web in 
Kelly and Perfect 10.  Still images seem like perhaps the hardest type of 
copyrighted work to use for many transformative purposes without using the entire 
image unaltered and unexcerpted.  It is difficult in many instances to use only part 
of an image—to make an abridgement or excerpt of it—and still convey the 
message or meaning of the image in order to criticize it, comment on it, place it in 
historical context, or index it for ease of location.  At the least, it is often more 
difficult than for other kinds of copyrighted works.  For example, in Núñez, where 
the newspaper printed three of the controversial photographs of Miss Puerto Rico 
Universe in their entirety, the court noted that the newspaper “admittedly copied 
the entire picture; however, to copy any less than that would have made the picture 
useless to the story.”102  Because the controversy revolved around whether the 
pictures were inappropriate for the subject’s position, it seems unlikely that the 
reporting of views on that appropriateness could have been adequately illustrated 
by using only cropped portions of the photos.103  On the other hand, if Miss Puerto 
Rico Universe had appeared nude in a video, it would likely have been easy to 
report on the controversy, and the claims about the video, by excerpting from it 
only a single still frame, or perhaps a short clip.  Similarly, in the case of search 
engines, it is easy to convey to the searcher something about each ordinary search 
result by quoting just a few relevant words of text from the Web page for each 
result included on a search results page (as many search engines do).  It is much 
harder to show a similarly small portion of an image as part of the results for an 
image search and convey any similarly meaningful information about the image to 
 
of how the plaintiff had, when he was 17, murdered his father and “fooled” the authorities in order to 
“get away scot-free” and collect money from his father’s estate. The defendants appear to have made 
and introduced into evidence in the custody dispute an entire, unaltered copy of the manuscript, and the 
plaintiff sued for copyright infringement.  The court concluded that the defendants’ use was fair.  While 
it did not discuss the question of transformativeness, the court stressed that the defendants were using 
the copyrighted manuscript for an entirely different purpose than the plaintiff’s purpose in writing (and 
seeking to publish) the manuscript—“for the evidentiary value of its content insofar as it contains 
admissions that Bond may have made against his interest when he bragged about his conduct in 
murdering his father, in taking advantage of the juvenile justice system, and in benefiting from his 
father’s estate.”  317 F.3d at 395.  The use of the manuscript in the context of the custody dispute is 
surely a use of an entirely different “purpose and character” and arguably one that alters the meaning or 
the message of the work by placing it in a different context—one involving the light that the work’s 
content sheds on the author’s fitness as a stepfather. 
 102. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 103. The photos apparently would have generally been unavailable elsewhere to the public (unlike 
a published book or movie), so that a reader could not have gone out and bought her own copy in order 
to evaluate the criticisms and defenses. 
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which the result refers.  And certainly a short quotation or brief excerpt from a 
magazine review of a Grateful Dead concert can convey some sense of the entire 
review more easily than a reproduction of only a part of a concert poster could 
convey a sense of the entire poster.  In short, a single picture may be worth 1,000 
words, but reproducing just one-tenth of a single picture typically conveys far less 
of the original than does quoting 100 words of a 1,000-word composition. 
Scenarios in which the use of entire textual works without alteration seems 
likely to be transformative have arisen, though none has yet led to an appellate 
court determination of transformativeness. Bond v. Blum involved copying an 
entire unpublished autobiographical “true crime” memoir to introduce it into 
evidence in a custody hearing on the fitness of the author’s household for the 
children involved.104 The court found fair use but never discussed 
transformativeness. And the recent district court opinion concerning the plagiarism-
detection service Turnitin found that storing copies of entire student papers in a 
database for comparison to other student-submitted work in order to identify 
plagiarism was a transformative use because of the transformative purpose for 
which the defendant used the entire student work.105  But for the most part, the 
cases finding transformative purpose even in the absence of any transformation of 
the content of the copyrighted work, may largely be limited to still images.106 
2.  Transforming Content Without Transformative Purpose 
Finally, in at least 12 cases, a defendant altered the content of the copyrighted 
work (or at least arguably had done so), but the defendant, at least in the court’s 
view, was not (or arguably was not) using the content for any transformative 
purpose.107 
Perhaps the most striking example is the Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin 
Books case, in which the defendants created The Cat NOT in the Hat about the O.J. 
Simpson murder trial, using characters and elements from the famous children’s 
book.108  The defendants had clearly altered Dr. Seuss’s original content quite 
substantially.  But because the Ninth Circuit concluded that the purpose of their use 
was to produce a satire rather than a parody (and also concluded that only the latter, 
not the former, constituted a transformative purpose), the transformativeness 
inquiry weighed against fair use. 
 
 104. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003).  See supra note 101. 
 105. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2008 WL 728389 (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 2008). 
 106. This would not be entirely unusual in copyright law. Much of the jurisprudence concerning 
the standard of originality required in order for a derivative work to qualify for copyright protection has 
emerged in cases involving derivative works of visual art (etchings, paintings, sculptural reproductions, 
etc.), and it is possible to see the heightened standard of originality that seems to emerge from those 
cases not as a general standard for all derivative works (such as translations, motion picture versions, 
sound recordings, etc.), but as a standard that primarily governs derivative works of visual art.  See 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2:220 to 2:222. 
 107. This section includes cases in which the court concluded that there was no transformative 
purpose, even if that conclusion seems clearly incorrect on the facts as presented by the court. 
 108. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).  See supra note 27. 
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Another example is Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, in 
which the defendant produced The Seinfeld Aptitude Test trivia quiz book, which 
required extracting information about characters and events from the television 
show to use in creating trivia questions.109  In evaluating transformativeness, the 
court concluded not only that “a secondary work need not necessarily transform the 
original work’s expression to have a transformative purpose”—that is, that the 
defendant need not alter the plaintiff’s content in order for the defendant’s use to be 
transformative—but also that such transformation of a work’s expression was not 
what mattered for fair use analysis.  Instead, what the court was looking for in 
evaluating transformativeness was whether the defendant used the work—
apparently in either altered or unaltered form—for a different purpose: 
Any transformative purpose possessed by The SAT is slight to non-existent. We reject 
the argument that The SAT was created to educate Seinfeld viewers or to criticize, 
“expose,” or otherwise comment upon Seinfeld. The SAT’s purpose . . . is to repackage 
Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers. . . . [W]e find scant reason to conclude that this 
trivia quiz book seeks to educate, criticize, parody, comment, report upon, or research 
Seinfeld, or otherwise serve a transformative purpose.110 
The court concluded that the defendant’s book “has transformed Seinfeld’s 
expression into trivia quiz book form with little, if any, transformative purpose.”111  
The court appears to have concluded that for fair use analysis, a defendant’s work 
will be “transformative” only if the defendant’s purpose is a transformative one, 
regardless of whether the defendant has in fact transformed any of the expression in 
the copyrighted work. 
In these and the other ten cases where the court found no transformative purpose 
even though the defendant had altered the content of the plaintiff’s work, the court 
determined that the use was not transformative for fair use purposes, and, indeed, in 
each case the court determined that the use was not, or was not likely to be, fair.112 
The analysis and outcomes in the cases involving only one type of 
transformation (either of content or purpose) suggests that in the fair use analysis, 
the far more important type is transformation of the purpose for which the work is 
used, rather than transformation of the work’s content.  If the defendant has a 
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 110. Id. at 142-43. 
 111. Id. at 143. 
 112. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997); Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 
154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1120, 1122 
(9th Cir. 1997); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS 
Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (use of film footage in ads for reporting on trial), amended 
and superseded on other grounds by L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 313 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 
2002); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Zomba Enters., 
Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007).  In at least two cases, the court’s 
discussion of the first factor leaves it unclear whether the court views the defendant’s purpose as 
transformative, and in those cases the court similarly found that the transformativeness inquiry weighed 
against fair use.  Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001); Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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transformative purpose, the court has generally found transformativeness, even if 
she has not altered the work’s content in any way, while if the defendant has no 
transformative purpose, the court has generally found no transformativeness, even 
if she has transformed the content of the work sufficiently to create a derivative 
work. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
This review of the appellate cases decided since Campbell should provide a 
better understanding of how appellate courts approach the question of 
transformativeness in fair use. First, those courts clearly do not view the 
preparation of a derivative work as necessarily transformative, such that the 
preparation of a derivative work is necessarily more likely (given the favored status 
of transformative uses) to constitute fair use. This should comfort those who have 
worried that Campbell’s emphasis on transformativeness would inappropriately 
interfere with copyright owners’ right to control ordinary derivative works. Second, 
appellate courts also clearly do not view the preparation of a derivative work—or 
any transformation or alteration of a work’s content—as necessary to a finding that 
a defendant’s use is transformative.  Instead, courts focus on whether the purpose 
of the defendant’s use is transformative. This may offer some reassurance to those 
who have worried that Campbell’s emphasis on transformativeness would 
inappropriately limit fair uses only to those that involved derivative uses, excluding 
those that involved unaltered reproductions of a copyrighted work.113 
This descriptive review leaves unanswered many normative questions about the 
nature and role of transformativeness in fair use analysis.  Clarifying that the core 
of the transformativeness inquiry, at least as currently deployed by the appellate 
courts, concerns the purpose of the defendant’s use may help to focus courts and 
commentators on more relevant normative questions. At the broadest level, the 
courts’ practice raises the question of whether evaluating a defendant’s purpose for 
transformativeness is the most appropriate approach to the “purpose and character” 
factor, or to implementing the Campbell Court’s understanding of transformative 
uses. 
Even accepting the focus on purpose leaves many more specific questions 
unanswered. For example, the transformativeness inquiry as framed here seems 
inescapably comparative: the court must have a sense of the plaintiff’s purpose in 
order to determine whether the defendant is using the work for a transformative 
purpose.  How should a court identify the purpose to which the defendant’s use is 
to be compared?  Is this the purpose that the author actually had in mind when 
creating the work, or is it the purpose that a reasonable author creating this type of 
work would have had in mind?  (Courts have so far paid attention to such questions 
primarily in the related context of determining whether a defendant’s use had a 
parodic purpose.)114  How should courts deal with an author who has a multitude of 
 
 113. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech 
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Lape, supra note 4, at 722. 
 114. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (identifying question as 
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intended uses for her work?  Furthermore, if an author, sometime after creating her 
work, decides to put it to a different purpose, how is that relevant to the question of 
transformativeness?  What if she decides to put her work to that purpose only after 
the defendant has already done so?  And if the author transfers copyright in the 
work to someone else, are the transferee’s purposes, if different from the author’s, 
relevant?  Questions might also arise as to how to properly identify the defendant’s 
purpose, particularly when that defendant might have multiple purposes, or where 
the use might satisfy multiple purposes, as the Campbell Court itself recognized in 
acknowledging that “a work may contain both parodic and nonparodic 
elements.”115 
In addition to thinking about how to identify the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
purposes, more attention might also usefully be paid to the question of how to 
determine which of a defendant’s purposes might be “transformative.”  The Second 
Circuit has said that a defendant’s use may not be transformative even when the 
defendant uses the copyrighted work for a different purpose than that for which the 
plaintiff uses it.116 That suggests that not all “different” purposes will be 
“transformative” ones, but courts have offered little express guidance on how to 
decide when a defendant’s different purpose is transformative. 
Finally, understanding the purpose-based focus of the transformativeness 
inquiry may also highlight questions about the interaction between that inquiry and 
the analysis, under the fourth fair use factor, of the effect of a defendant’s use on 
the “potential market” for the copyrighted work.117 If the defendant’s use is for a 
transformative purpose, the use may reach a market that the copyright owner has 
not yet entered but that could be a relevant “potential market” under the fourth 
factor. And just as courts have recognized in the fourth factor that it would be 
circular to identify market harm merely from the fact that the particular defendant 
being sued did not pay the copyright owner for the particular use she made, courts 
may need to find ways to avoid a similar circularity in judging transformativeness. 
Courts should probably not conclude that a defendant’s use is not transformative 
simply because the copyright owner herself might at some point use (or intend to 
use) the work for the same purpose, but should probably also not conclude that a 
defendant’s use must be transformative if the copyright owner has not yet exploited 
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